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Recent Research on the Minimum
Wage: Implications for Missouri
By Jonathan Meer
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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The minimum wage has long been a contentious policy issue, but particularly
so in Missouri in recent years. When St. Louis raised its city minimum wage
in 2015, with increases planned to $11 per hour by 2018, legal battles held up
implementation and a state law eventually overrode the local ordinance. This
essay delves into the sources of this policy dispute, first by examining the
theoretical issues involved, then focusing on recent research, particularly
regarding outcomes other than the traditional focus on employment
outcomes. Using minimum wage increases as an anti-poverty policy is not
likely to succeed. While the empirical evidence using more traditional models
is decidedly mixed, once we allow for longer-lived dynamic effects, the
evidence shows that job growth declines among those most often viewed as
beneficiaries of minimum wage increases. Already-marginalized groups are
likely to be hardest hit as employers substitute towards workers with more
experience.
1. INTRODUCTION
The minimum wage has long been a contentious policy issue, but particularly
so in Missouri in recent years. When St. Louis raised its city minimum wage
in 2015, with increases planned to $11 per hour by 2018, legal battles held up
implementation and a state law eventually overrode the local ordinance. The
minimum wage increased to $10 per hour in that city for just three months in
the middle of 2017, before returning back to the state level of $7.70. But lost
in much of this bitter battle is a broader view of the history and economics of
the minimum wage.
This essay delves into the sources of this policy dispute. I begin with a
discussion of the theoretical issues involved, then focus on recent research,
particularly regarding outcomes other than the traditional focus on
employment outcomes. I conclude with an analysis of who benefits from a
minimum wage increase and whether it is a policy well-suited to fighting
poverty.

A version of this paper appeared in
the Missouri Policy Journal, Number
7, Fall/Winter 2018.

2. MODELING THE EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGE
INCREASES
The academic and policy debate over the minimum wage is over a century
old, dating back to well before the first minimum wage law in the United
States was enacted, in Massachusetts in 1912.1 On one side of the debate, the
argument is simple: workers whose production is worth less to their
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employers than the minimum wage cannot remain
employed.2 Originally, this was a feature of the policy,
rather than an unintended consequence; much of the
original intent of minimum wage laws were to reduce
the demand for low-skill labor, often with explicitly
racist and eugenicist reasoning. In 1912, Sidney Webb,
co-founder of the London School of Economics, wrote
regarding those whose productivity did not generate
enough income to make a living, that “of all the ways of
dealing with these unfortunate parasites, the most
ruinous to the community is to allow them to
unrestrainedly compete as wage earners.”3 This suggests
a role for substitution of one type of labor for another
that might reduce the employment response. Indeed,
Webb felt that employment would not decrease overall,
even as certain groups lost their jobs – employers would
substitute towards higher-skilled workers. Webb further
argued that increased wages for low-skilled workers
would be passed through to consumers in the form of
higher prices or that profits would simply be reduced,
with businesses continuing to employ the same number
of workers as before.4
A straightforward economic analysis reveals the
problem with these latter claims, which are still being
made today. As H.B. Lees Smith put it in 1907, “a rise
in the price of a commodity will lead to a decrease in the
demand for it. This means that a certain amount of the
labour and capital hitherto employed in the production
of the commodity must seek other occupations. But this
is likely to involve both the labourers and employers in a
loss… It is no kindness to the workers in a trade to
merely turn them out of it.”5 Lees Smith made the same
counter-argument regarding falling profits: reducing the
returns to a business reliant on low-skill labor leads to a
shift in resources towards other activities, reducing the
demand for labor and leading to the creation of “a class
prevented by the State from obtaining employment.”
These arguments were based on theory rather than
empirical analysis, and Lees Smith noted that the
amount of displaced labor depended on the
characteristics of the industry.
In the intervening decades, a number of more
sophisticated models of the labor market have been
utilized to analyze the effects of the minimum wage.
These models primarily revolve around how much
market power is held by employers – that is, whether
MEER

employers are able to exert some control over the wages
they pay, rather than paying the prevailing wage rate set
in a smoothly-functioning market. In the presence of
monopsony (employer market power) in the labor
market, a higher minimum wage (up to a certain level)
can actually increase employment even as it increases
wages.
But there is reason to doubt that this sort of market
power is at play for low-skill labor of the type that is
affected by minimum wages. Most minimum-wage
workers are employed by small establishments, with
fewer than half of such workers at firms with 100 or
more employees.6 It is difficult to imagine that a fastfood restaurant on one corner exerts control over the
low-skill labor market, as does the fast-food restaurant
across the street. More to the point, low-skill labor is, by
definition, fungible across firms and industries. An
individual employed as a janitor in for a fast-food
restaurant can work as a janitor at any sort of
establishment, or in similar manual-labor occupations.
Therefore, firms must exert monopsony power over
vast swaths of the low-skill labor market – an unlikely
proposition.
But monopsony of the traditional, textbook type – that
is, a “company town” in which there is only one
employer – is not fully necessary for these conditions to
hold. The presence of search frictions in the labor
market can give rise to this kind of local wage-setting
power, at least in the short run, because workers cannot
easily switch to employers who offer slightly higher
wages.7 But in the longer run, as movement by workers
between firms is more common, this type of market
power seems less likely to be a factor.8 Any rents
generated by underpaying workers will be dissipated in a
competitive market for the output of these firms. For
example, even if a restaurant is able to pay wages below
the competitive market level, the profits generated will
be competed away as other establishments enter.
Increased labor costs in the form of a minimum wage
increase must drive some marginal firms out, reducing
overall employment even if some remaining firms
increase their level of employment. The razor-thin profit
margins of the restaurant industry, which employs the
largest share of minimum-wage workers, suggest that
there is little scope for broad-based employment
increases of this nature.
2
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These models also generate some implications that have
been tested and found wanting. The monopsony model
suggests that a well-designed minimum wage will
increase firms’ labor input and therefore the firm’s
output. This increase in output implies that prices for
the goods and services produced by that labor are likely
to decrease. Empirical evidence in the restaurant
industry finds, however, that prices increase after a
minimum wage increase.9 Further, the monopsony
model of the labor market predicts that there will be
substantial bunching of workers at a new, higher
minimum wage, as employers are forced to pay workers
at that higher level. That is, a number of workers will be
paid at exactly the level of the new minimum wage. In
contrast, the competitive model of the labor market, in
which workers who produce value below the minimum
wage are unemployed, predicts no such bunching.
Recent research suggests that the prevalence of
employment at the higher minimum wages that went
into effect at the end of the first decade of the 21st
century was significantly below the predictions of these
monopsony models.10
Some search-and-matching models of the labor market
add an additional layer of sophistication. Workers’
search effort could respond to higher minimum wages,
potentially inducing them to enter the labor force or
search more vigorously for better jobs.11 Under certain
conditions, this entry and additional effort generates
more productivity for employers, potentially enough to
reverse negative employment effects. However, there is
no evidence that higher minimum wages leads to labormarket entry, and increases in search effort among those
already searching tends to be very short-lived.12
3. WHAT ARE THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF
MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES?
The empirical literature on the minimum wage was
fairly dormant until the early 1990s, with the handful of
papers on the subject generally finding small but
meaningful disemployment effects for less-experienced
workers.13 The publication of Card and Krueger’s study
of fast-food restaurants in New Jersey (which had
increased its minimum wage) and Pennsylvania (which
had not), sparked a renewed interest in the topic.14 They
found no evidence of employment losses in their phone
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survey of several hundred establishments across the two
states, and potentially some evidence of employment
increases. A vigorous debate ensued, with criticisms of
their empirical approach and difficulties replicating their
findings using administrative data.15
The empirical literature on the employment effects of
minimum wage increases in more recent years has
homed in on the question of forming the correct
counterfactual – that is, how would the labor market in
the area that increased its minimum wage have evolved
in the absence of such a change? This is a difficult
question because there are numerous factors that might
lead to spurious correlation between minimum wage
increases and decreases in employment levels, like other
employment regulations enacted in close proximity to
those increases or changes in business conditions. Some
researchers argue for the importance of accounting for
spatial heterogeneity – that is, more closely controlling
for regional differences.16 One popular approach in this
literature is the use of border discontinuities, in which
counties in states that are adjacent to each other, but
have different minimum wages, are used as a
comparison group. This branch of the literature can be
summarized as arguing that when the correct controls
are included, there tends to be no statistically significant
effect from an increase in the minimum wage on the
level of employment. But others argue that these
approaches are invalid since they are sensitive to the
time periods being examined, contiguous counties may
not be good controls for each other, and ultimately,
these models push the data beyond useful inference.17
Regardless, even study designs that find negative and
statistically significant employment effects tend to find
relatively small effects.18
What might be the sources of this empirical confusion?
It is possible that the monopsony or search-andmatching explanations discussed above are, in fact, true.
More importantly, the minimum wage increases enacted
prior to the last few years have tended to be fairly small,
binding on only a small percentage of the workforce. In
2017, those paid at or below their state’s minimum wage
made up just 3.5% of employees; even among workers
paid by the hour, fewer than 6% were paid at or below
the minimum wage. Many researchers focus on groups
that are more likely to be affected, like teenagers and
3
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restaurant workers. But, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2,
only about one in five working teenagers earns
minimum wage and only about one-fifth of minimum
wage workers are teenagers , making it difficult to see
effects in the data. And while the food services industry
employs the largest share of minimum wage workers
(about 36% in 2017), only about one-quarter of the
workers in the industry are minimum wage workers.
And among those workers, about half receive tips,
making their true hourly wage much higher than what
their employer pays. In many states, tipped workers are
subject to a lower minimum wage than other workers;
for example, the tipped minimum wage in Missouri is
$3.93 in 2018, as compared to $7.85 overall. This lower
level for tipped workers often does not increase when
the general minimum wage does. It is therefore not
surprising that those workers are relatively unaffected by
minimum wage increases. A focus on less-educated
workers and those working in low-wage occupations
seems to be a more effective approach.19 Another
reason for a relatively muted impact on the number of
jobs is that employers may reduce hours of work even as
they maintain the same number of workers; due to data
limitations, few studies have been able to examine this
margin of adjustment with much precision.
The new wave of high minimum wages in recent years
provides a useful laboratory for examining effects on
employment. Twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia have raised their minimum wages since 2014,
and a number of municipalities have increased local
minimum wages. Local minimum wages are a relatively
new (and still fairly limited) phenomenon, with only 41
municipalities having a minimum wage higher than their
state’s in 2018, compared to just five in 2012. Some of
these are quite high compared to other areas. Seattle has
had a $15 per hour minimum wage since 2017, a level
that exceeds wages for over half of the hourly
workforce if it were in effect in Missouri. It is difficult
for even the most ardent minimum wage proponent to
credibly argue that a minimum wage of this level and
scope would have no impact on the workforce.
Seattle’s minimum wage increase was a useful case study
for researchers for several reasons. First, it was quite
large relative to other previously-studied changes.
Second, it was a city-level policy that raised the
MEER

Figure 1: Age Distribution of Minimum Wage
Workers in 2017

Source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups, 2017

Figure 2: Share of Minimum Wage Workers in Each
Age Group, 2017

Source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups, 2017

minimum wage to a much higher level than neighboring
areas (the proposed increase considered by St. Louis
would create a similar disparity). And finally, the state
of Washington tracks hours of work, unlike most other
states. The Seattle Minimum Wage Project research
team found very large effects, to the extent that total
hours worked in low-wage jobs fell by 9% after the
incremental increase to $13 per hour in 2016 from $11
in 2015 and $9.32 in 2014 (the final step of the increase,
to $15 per hour in 2017, is still being studied; the city’s
4
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minimum wage is now indexed to inflation and rises
automatically each year).20 Following the minimum wage
increase, total payroll for low-wage workers actually fell
by an average of $125 per month: those workers for
whom the increase was supposed to help were actually
receiving fewer dollars on average after the minimum
wage increase than before. Unsurprisingly, the study
came in for immediate criticism from minimum wage
advocates, but its methodological approach is sound and
most of the critiques are groundless.21

topic are ill suited for capturing these longer-lived
impacts and, indeed, lead to biased estimates that are far
smaller than the true impacts.26 As an example, using
three administrative data sets and a more flexible
econometric model, Jeremy West and I found that
minimum wage increases reduced job growth that took
several years to be reflected in the level of
employment.27 And the overall negative effect on
employment was significantly larger than that found in
much of the earlier research.

A recent line of inquiry takes a different tack, suggesting
that the econometric specifications used in previous
research may have been incorrect. The sorts of
empirical models frequently used in the minimum wage
literature are well designed for capturing the effects of
sharp changes in the level of employment when one
state changes its policies and others do not. But there
are good reasons to believe that the shifts in
employment will be more gradual. For example,
substituting away from low-skill labor (counter help)
towards capital (self-service kiosks) in fast-food
restaurants takes time as employers adjust their patterns
or new types of establishments replace older, more
labor-intensive ones.22 There is evidence that employers
do indeed look to automate work in response minimum
wage increase.23 Further, if employers may be reluctant
to fire workers for morale reasons, they reduce the size
of their workforce through attrition by simply not hiring
as many replacements for workers who leave. They can
also demand more effort from their remaining
employees in exchange for higher wages, which will lead
to a slowdown in hiring expansion.24 In that case, each
employee is expected to work more, so the return to
hiring an additional employee is reduced. The searchand-matching models described previously also imply
more gradual changes, rather than the sudden drop in
employment predicted by simpler supply and demand
kinds of models. These types of slow adjustments are
not a novel insight in labor economics,25 yet had rarely
been considered in the context of the minimum wage.

The early proponents of minimum wages, who were
often driven by a desire to exclude women, immigrants,
and minorities from the labor force, understood that
employers might substitute towards different types of
labor if statutory wages made it unprofitable to employ
more low-skilled workers. But the evidence on whether
this exclusion occurs is limited. Studies have examined
whether the impacts of the minimum wage vary by
demographic group and have found inconsistent
results.28 However, recent work that I conducted with
Jeffrey Clemens and Lisa Kahn shows that minimum
wage increases tend to reduce the employment of young
adults and high school dropouts. We also find that
employers’ job postings following minimum wage
increases see an increase in requirements for high school
degrees, reducing the job opportunities for the leastcredentialed workers in the labor force.29 Evidence from
the Seattle Minimum Wage Project also suggests that
employers reallocate hours towards higher-paid workers,
indicating substitution towards more highly-skilled
employees at the expense of lower-skilled ones.30 This
has important implications for the distributional impact
of minimum wage increases, discussed below.

Taken together, then, the impact of the minimum wage
on employment may be dynamic, operating through
reductions in job growth that take several years to be
fully reflected in the level of employment. The
specifications used in most previous research on this
MEER

Another avenue to consider how changes in the
minimum wage affect the composition of
compensation. After all, cash wages are just one part of
a labor contract. Flexibility of work hours, working
conditions, and non-wage benefits also are important
aspects of the job experience that have, for the most
part, received little attention in this research. It is
difficult, after all, to objectively measure working
conditions or track employee perks like free parking,
uniforms, or meals. However, a more easily-observed
benefit is employer-provided health insurance (EPHI).
The prevalence of EPHI in low-wage jobs is higher than
5
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might be expected, with about 45% of those in lowpaying jobs receiving it. Earlier research, using data
from 1979 to 2000, found no impact on the provision
of health insurance by employers.31 But more recent
work, after the passage of the Affordable Care Act,
finds that minimum wage increases significantly reduce
EPHI, clawing back some of the wage gains even for
those workers who retain their employment.32
Depending on how gains and losses are distributed and
the value workers place on these benefits, worker wellbeing can be harmed by an increase in minimum wages
even without employment losses.
A final line of recent research has important
implications for the accuracy of the border-discontinuity
designs discussed above, and particularly for Missouri,
whose two largest cities - Kansas City and St. Louis border other states. A growing consensus has emerged
that local minimum wage increases affect the location
and commuting decisions of low-wage workers. Lowskill immigrants are less likely to locate in areas with
high minimum wages.33 Low-wage workers increase
commuting out of those areas and reduce commuting
into them.34 Recent results from the Seattle Minimum
Wage Project show that hours of work fell in the areas
very close to Seattle, likely the result of changes in the
composition of workers.35 These kinds of spillovers
make the “natural experiment” of contiguous counties
across state borders less precise and can reduce the
estimated impact on employment, even as workers are
displaced to other areas.

The composition of the minimum wage workforce is
not tilted towards low-income households, to the
surprise of many observers. Yet this is not a new
observation: only a quarter of minimum wage workers
were poor in the mid-1980s, and about 30% in the mid1990s.36 Despite significant changes in the labor force
over the past few decades, this is still true today. Using
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current
Population Survey, I find that median cash income for
families with a minimum wage earner in them was
$49,500 in 2017, with 10% of those families earning
over $150,000 (see Figure 3). Only 14% of those
families receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program aid (commonly known as Food Stamps), and
40% of minimum wage workers live in households
earning more than double the supplemental poverty
line, while only 20% live below it.
Figure 3: Income Distribution of Families with
Minimum Wage Workers, 2017

4. THE MINIMUM WAGE AS AN ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM
Along with an attempt to increase workers’ power in the
labor market, the minimum wage is often promoted as
an attempt to reduce poverty. Even if employers, rather
than consumers or workers, bear much of the cost of
the minimum wage, many of them are the owners of
small single-establishment firms like restaurants or
convenience stores. The owners may not be particularly
wealthy themselves. With rigorous evidence of the
impact on business owners essentially nonexistent,
focus necessarily turns to minimum wage workers
themselves.
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Source: Current Population Survey, March 2017

It is no surprise, then, that the purported benefits of an
increase in the minimum wage do not generally accrue
to low-income households. The Congressional Budget
Office estimated that nearly three times as much income
would accrue to families above the poverty line than
those below.37 A recent study by MaCurdy (2015) began
with an assumption that there would be no employment
losses at all and that higher minimum wages would be
passed through to prices, so as to estimate the impact of
the most optimistic possibilities. He found that these
price increases would be regressive, costing low-income
6
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households relatively more than high-income ones, and
that the benefits from higher wages would not be
concentrated among poor households.38 It then follows
that, despite the hopes of advocates that minimum wage
increases will reduce reliance on government incomesupport programs, that does not seem to be the case.39
Who, then, makes up the minimum wage workforce?
Again relying on Current Population Survey data, I find
that half are 25 years old or younger, and nearly 70% are
under 35. Figure 1 shows the age distribution of
minimum wage workers. Only about a third are full-time
workers, and slightly over a quarter are enrolled in high
school or college. Figure 4 shows that nearly 40% live
with their parents, and fewer than one-fifth are adults
with children. Simply put, the minimum wage is badly
targeted for poverty alleviation. Further, when job losses
do occur because of increases in the minimum wage,
they are likely to be concentrated among those who are
most marginally attached to the labor force. After all,
when an employer must pay a very high wage even for
entry-level work, why would he or she take a chance on
someone with a felony conviction, a single mother who
needs some flexibility to care for her children, or a high
school dropout struggling to gain work experience?
Labor force participation among many marginalized
groups is shockingly low, and increases in the minimum
wage may only exacerbate this fact. For example, among
African-American high school dropouts under the age
of 65 who are not currently incarcerated or in the
military, only 19% held a full-time job in 2017. And for
those in labor force, the unemployment rate was 16%,
four times the level for all others. It is difficult to see,
therefore, how the prospects for those individuals are
improved by making it illegal to pay them less than $11,
$12, or the popular $15 per hour, a wage latter rate
would bind on 89% of that group. It simply beggars
belief that their chances for employment would be not
be negatively affected.
In Missouri, the median wage for hourly workers is
$14.25, with a quarter being paid $10.50 or less. Of all
hourly workers, only 3.6% earn less than or equal to the
state minimum wage in 2017, making up 2.2% of all
workers. But in the center-city area of St. Louis, most
likely to be affected by the proposed city minimum
MEER

Figure 4: Relationship in Household for Minimum
Wage Workers, 2017

Source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups, 2017

wage hike, the median wage was $12.75. Here 37% of
hourly workers earned less than or equal to the $11 per
hour proposed wage and thus are in most danger of
seeing reduced benefits, hours of work, or possibly
losing their jobs entirely.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Good anti-poverty policy should preserve incentives on
one side of the market to work and on the other side to
hire, and be well-targeted to the needy. Workers
certainly want to be paid more, but the minimum wage
fails on the other counts. While the empirical evidence
using more traditional models is decidedly mixed, once
we allow for longer-lived dynamic effects, the evidence
shows that job growth declines among those most often
viewed as beneficiaries of minimum wage increases.
Already-marginalized groups are likely to be hardest hit
as employers substitute towards workers with more
experience.
Minimum wage increases of the magnitude recently
proposed would have much more negative economic
and social impacts, especially in areas where the
prevailing market wages are lower. The popular “Fight
for Fifteen” proposal to raise the national minimum
wage to $15 per hour would have serious consequences
for states like Missouri, where over half of hourly
workers currently earn less than that amount. And for
7
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cities like St. Louis, Seattle’s experience serves as a
cautionary tale: Even though Seattle is experiencing an
economic boom, low-wage workers, on average, saw a
reduction in their earnings relative to what they would
have been without the minimum wage increase. Even if
there is employer market power over low-skill labor,
there is no reason to believe that policymakers are
capable of designing an optimal minimum wage across
all industries and localities that meets the criteria
necessary to prevent employment such losses.
Anti-poverty efforts should be concentrated on more
effective policies, like the earned income tax credit,
which supplements low-income households’ labor

earnings. Unlike the minimum wage advocates of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, today’s advocates are,
in general, well-intentioned in trying to tackle difficult
issues of poverty and economic mobility. Unfortunately,
the best of intentions are no substitute for good policy.
Jonathan Meer is a professor of economics at Texas A&M
University and a research associate with the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful for comments from Jeffrey
Clemens and Jeremy West. Funding for this study was made
possible by the Hammond Institute's Center for Economics and
the Environment, Lindenwood University.

NOTES
For a thorough review, see Thomas C. Leonard, “The Very Idea
of Applying Economics: The Modern Minimum-Wage Controversy
and its Antecedents,” History of Political Economy 32, no. Suppl_1
(2000): 117-144.
2 Henry Sidgwick, “Economic Socialism,” The Contemporary Review,
1866-1900 50 (1886): 620-631; George J. Stigler, “The Economics
of Minimum Wage Legislation,” The American Economic Review 36,
no. 3 (1946): 358-365.
3 Quoted in Thomas C. Leonard, Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics,
and American Economics in the Progressive Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2016).
4 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London:
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1897).
5 HB Lees Smith, “Economic Theory and Proposals for a Legal
Minimum Wage,” The Economic Journal (1907): 504-512.
6 Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren,
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version
5.0 [dataset]. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2017).
7 Kenneth Burdett and Dale T. Mortensen, “Wage Differentials,
Employer Size, and Unemployment,” International Economic Review
(1998): 257-273; Alan Manning, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect
Competition in Labor Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2003).
8 Peter Kuhn, “Is Monopsony the Right Way to Model Labor
Markets? A Review of Alan Manning’s Monopsony in Motion,”
International Journal of the Economics of Business 11, no. 3 (2004): 369378.
9 Daniel Aaronson and Eric French, “Product Market Evidence on
the Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage,” Journal of Labor
Economics 25, no. 1 (2007): 167-200; Charles Brown, Comment for
Review Symposium “Myth and Measurement: The New Economics
of the Minimum Wage.” Industrial & Labor Relations Review 48, no. 4
(1995): 827.
1

MEER

Jeffrey Clemens, “The Low-Skilled Labor Market from 2002 to
2014: Measurement and Mechanisms,” SIEPR Discussion Paper No.
16-006 (2016).
11 Daron Acemoglu, “Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs,” Journal of Labor
Economics 19, no. 1 (2001): 1-21; Christopher J. Flinn, “Minimum
Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes Under Search, Matching,
and Endogenous Contact Rates,” Econometrica 74, no. 4 (2006):
1013-1062.
12 Camilla Adams, Jonathan Meer, and Carly Will Sloan, “The
Minimum Wage and Search Effort,” Working Paper (2018). Texas
A&M University.
13 Charles Brown, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen, “The Effect
of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment,”
Journal of Economic Literature 20, no. 2 (1982): 487-528.
14 David Card and Alan B. Krueger, “Minimum Wages and
Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania,” The American Economic Review 84, no. 4
(1994): 772-793; David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
15 John Kennan, “The Elusive Effects of Minimum Wages,” Journal
of Economic Literature 33, no. 4 (1995): 1950-1965; David Neumark
and William Wascher, “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case
Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania:
Comment,” American Economic Review 90, no. 5 (2000): 1362-1396.
16 Sylvia A. Allegretto, Arindrajit Dube, Michael Reich, and Ben
Zipperer, “Credible Research Designs for Minimum Wage Studies,”
(2017). ILR Review 70, no. 3: 559-592.
17 David Neumark, JM Ian Salas, and William Wascher, “Revisiting
the Minimum Wage—Employment Debate: Throwing Out the
Baby with the Bathwater?” ILR Review 67, no. 3_suppl (2014): 608648.
10

8

RECENT RESEARCH ON THE MINIMUM WAGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR MISSOURI

Jeffrey Clemens and Michael Strain, “Minimum Wage Analysis
Using a Pre-Committed Research Design: Evidence Through
2016,” (2018).
19 Jeffrey Clemens and Michael Wither, “The Minimum Wage and
the Great Recession: Evidence of Effects on the Employment and
Income Trajectories of Low-Skilled Workers,” National Bureau of
Economic Research No. 20724 (2014).
20 Ekaterina Jardim, Mark C. Long, Robert Plotnick, Emma Van
Inwegen, Jacob Vigdor, and Hilary Wething, “Minimum Wage
Increases, Wages, and Low-Wage Employment: Evidence from
Seattle,” National Bureau of Economic Research No. 23532 (2017).
21 Jonathan Meer, “A Minimum-Wage Study Faces Misplaced
Skepticism,” National Review, June 29, 2017, accessed May 18, 2018,
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/06/seattle-minimumwage-university-washington-study-critics-wrong/
22 Daniel Aaronson, Eric French, Isaac Sorkin, and Ted To,
“Industry Dynamics and the Minimum Wage: A Putty‐Clay
Approach,” International Economic Review 59, no. 1 (2018): 51-84;
Isaac Sorkin, “Are There Long-Run Effects of the Minimum
Wage?” Review of Economic Dynamics 18, no. 2 (2015): 306-333.
23 Grace Lordan and David Neumark, “People Versus Machines:
The Impact of Minimum Wages on Automatable Jobs,” National
Bureau of Economic Research No. 23667, (2017); Daniel Aaronson and
Brian J. Phelan, “Wage Shocks and the Technological Substitution
of Low‐Wage Jobs,” The Economic Journal (Forthcoming).
24 Marie Louise Obenauer and Bertha Marie von der Nienburg,
Effect of Minimum-Wage Determinations in Oregon: July, 1915
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1915), No. 6;
Mark Bils, Yongsung Chang, and Sun-Bin Kim, “How Sticky
Wages in Existing Jobs Can Affect Hiring,” National Bureau of
Economic Research No. 19821 (2014).
25 Daniel S. Hamermesh, “Labor Demand and the Structure of
Adjustment Costs,” The American Economic Review (1989): 674-689;
Walter Y. Oi, “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor,” Journal of Political
Economy 70, no. 6 (1962): 538-555.
26 Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West, “Effects of the Minimum Wage
on Employment Dynamics,” National Bureau of Economic Research
No. 19262 (2013).
27 Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West, “Effects of the Minimum Wage
on Employment Dynamics,” Journal of Human Resources 51, no. 2
(2016): 500-522.
28 David Neumark and William Wascher, “The Effects of
Minimum Wages on Teenage Employment and Enrollment:
Estimates from Matched CPS Data,” Research in Labor Economics
(1996), 25-64.
18

MEER

Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich, “Minimum
Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous
Counties,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 4 (2010): 945964.
29 Jeffrey Clemens, Jonathan Meer, and Lisa Kahn, “Dropouts
Need Not Apply: Labor Substitution and the Minimum Wage,”
Working Paper (2018). Texas A&M University.
30 Ekaterina Jardim and Emma van Inwegen, “Payroll, Revenue,
and Labor Demand Effects of the Minimum Wage,” Working
Paper (2017). University of Washington.
31 Kosali Ilayperuma Simon and Robert Kaestner, “Do Minimum
Wages Affect Non-Wage Job Attributes? Evidence on Fringe
Benefits,” ILR Review 58, no. 1 (2004): 52-70.
32 Jeffrey Clemens, Lisa Kahn, and Jonathan Meer, “The Minimum
Wage, Fringe Benefits, and Worker Welfare,” National Bureau of
Economic No. 24635 (2018).
33Brian C. Cadena, “Recent Immigrants as Labor Market
Arbitrageurs: Evidence from the Minimum Wage,” Journal of Urban
Economics 80 (2014): 1-12.
34 Terra McKinnish, “Cross-State Differences in the Minimum
Wage and Out-of-State Commuting by Low-Wage Workers,”
Regional Science and Urban Economics 64 (2017): 137-147; Jorge Perez
Perez, “City Minimum Wages,” Working Paper (2018). Brown
University.
35 Ekaterina Jardim, Mark C. Long, Robert Plotnick, Emma van
Inwegen, Jacob Vigdor, and Hilary Wething, “The Extent of Local
Minimum Wage Spillovers,” Working Paper (2018). University of
Washington.
36 Ralph E. Smith and Bruce Vavrichek, “The Minimum Wage: Its
Relation to Incomes and Poverty,” Monthly Labor Review 110, no. 6
(1987): 24-30; David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
37 Congressional Budget Office, “The Effects of a Minimum-Wage
Increase on Employment and Family Income,” (2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/ 44995.
38 Thomas MaCurdy, “How Effective is the Minimum Wage at
Supporting the Poor?” Journal of Political Economy 123, no. 2 (2015):
497-545.
39 Jeffrey Clemens, “Redistribution Through Minimum Wage
Regulation: An Analysis of Program Linkages and Budgetary
Spillovers,” Tax Policy and the Economy 30, no. 1 (2016): 163-189.

9

